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A ACCIDENT occurs while the 737 approaches Los Angeles.
flight attendant fails to latch the door to her service cart,
spills a pot of hot coffee on a passenger's lap, and severely burns
that passenger. Can that passenger bring a state law tort action
against the airline? Whether such claimant has a remedy re-
mains unclear in light of the most recent pronouncement by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gee v. Southwest Airlines.' Gee,
an opinion issued on April 4, 1997, involved four separate ac-
* The author is a litigation attorney at the Los Angeles office of Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan L.L.P., and is a former law clerk to the Honorable Linda H.
McLaughlin, United States District Court, Central District of California. He re-
ceived his B.A. from the University of California, Davis in 1992 and hisJ.D. from
the UCLA School of Law in 1995. I wish to thank Joseph W. Dung, D. Wayne
Jeffries, Schuyler M. Moore, Michael F. Perlis, Matthew C. Thompson, Hao-Nhien
Q. Vu, and the members of the Journal of Air Law and Commerce for their editorial
assistance, Lovdy Hamm for her additional assistance, my aviation law professor,
Rod Margo, for his inspiration, and my wife Hiromi Hirakata for her confidence
and support.
1 110 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
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tions consolidated for argument.2 Appellants sought damages
against various airlines based on in-flight events ranging from
loathsome behavior by fellow passengers to objects dropping on
them from overhead bins. The appellants appealed summary
judgment grants to defendant airlines based on the preemption
of their state tort claims by the Federal Aviation Authority Au-
thorization Act. The court held that the ADA preempts state law
claims relating to an airline's "rendition of services" but not
those relating to its "safety and operations."3 However, while its
holding may be reasonable, the court may be drawing a distinc-
tion that is untenable in practice.
I. FEDERAL AIRLINE REGULATION
The preemption clause of the Federal Aviation Authority Au-
thorization Act4 (known and referred to in this article as the
Airline Deregulation Act, the ADA or the Act) provides that a
state "may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provi-
sion having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or
service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under
this subpart."5 "Service" is not defined in the Act itself.
The rationale behind the ADA, according to the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB), is to deregulate the economic aspects of
interstate transportation.6 The preemption clause was specifi-
cally designed to prevent states from regulating any economic
aspects of air transportation. The CAB explained that "preemp-
tion extends to all of the economic factors that go into the provi-
sion of the quid pro quo for passenger's fare.... [A] state may
not interfere with the services that carriers offer in exchange for
their rates and fares."7
The preemptive scope of the clause has been clarified by two
recent Supreme Court opinions. In Morales v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.,' the Court held that state guidelines governing air
fare advertising were preempted under the ADA.9 The Court, in
2 See, e.g., Gee v. Southwest Airlines, CV-94-03983-CW, 1995 WL 652463 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 31, 1995); Rowley v. American Airlines, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Or.
1995); Costa v. American Airlines, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
3 Gee, 110 F.3d at 1400.
4 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1994).
5 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (emphasis added).
6 See 44 Fed. Reg. 9948-49 (1977).
7 Id.
8 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
9 See id. at 384.
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adopting a broad definition of the phrase "related to," con-
cluded that advertising was sufficiently "related to the service of
an air carrier."10 By focusing exclusively on the phrase "relating
to," the Court left the scope of "services" undefined. However,
the Court acknowledged that there would be situations where
the state action affecting rates, routes, or services would be "too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral" to have any preemptive effect."
Yet, the Court declined to express where it would be appropri-
ate to draw the line.
Then, in American Airlines v. Wolens, Inc.,' 2 the Court held that
American Airlines' attempt to retroactively modify its frequent
flyer program was not preempted by section 41713(b) (1), re-
gardless of whether the program related to the services of the
airline.13 The Court found, in part, that if the obligations were
self-imposed by the airlines in the first place, they did not
amount to a state's enactment or enforcement of a law or regu-
lation and, thus, did not come within the type of claims pre-
empted under the ADA. 4
II. ADA PREEMPTION
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of
ADA preemption of personal injury claims or the scope of "serv-
ices" under the preemption statute. However, several circuit
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have spoken on the issue.
The majority of circuits that have dealt with the issue have: (1)
found that there is no preemption for personal injury actions
based on negligence 5 and (2) defined the scope of "services"
narrowly, limiting preemption to activity that is based on eco-
nomic decisions and that relates to the contractual features that
are bargained for by passengers.' 6
10 Id. at 383.
11 Id. at 390 (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
12 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
13 See id. at 226.
14 See id. at 228.
15 There is no provision in the ADA for personal injury or property damage
lawsuits. Although the FAA requires airlines to provide "safe and adequate" ser-
vice to their passengers (49 U.S.C. § 41702 (1994)), both the FAA and the ADA
are silent when it comes to a passenger's private right of action for damages suf-
fered as a result of a violation of this standard. See Romano v. American Trans
Air, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1637, 1643 n.5, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 428 (1996) (statutes and
cases cited therein).
16 See, e.g., id.; Smith v. America West Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995);
Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Northwest
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In Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,1 7 for example, the Fifth Circuit
held that a plaintiffs personal injury claim stemming from a
bottle of rum that fell from an overhead compartment onto her
head was not preempted by the ADA. This decision was based
on the court's view that the use of overhead compartments for
luggage storage pertains to decisions regarding the navigation
of an air carrier, rather than decisions regarding the service of
baggage handling.' 8 The service of baggage handling, accord-
ing to the court, would encompass an airline's policy of permit-
ting passengers to carry certain types of baggage onto the plane,
along with other decisions that relate to the contractual bargain
between the airline and its passengers-decisions that "do not
refer directly to the way in which the aircraft is operated." 9 The
court noted that Congress meant to protect decisions regarding
baggage handling, boarding procedures, provision of food and
drink, and ticketing from state regulation. 0
In addition, the Hodges court found that Congress explicitly
preserved state law personal injury and property damage claims
through the enactment of 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a) (the Savings
Clause) .21 The Savings Clause requires that aircraft carriers
maintain insurance to cover liability for personal injury, death,
or property damage resulting from the operation of the air-
craft.22 Attempting to gauge the intent of Congress, the court
noted that complete preemption of state law in personal injury
cases would render the Savings Clause unnecessary. Thus, the
court reasoned, Congress probably did not intend to preempt
actions for personal injury based on negligence in the operation
and maintenance of the aircraft. 3
III. HARRIS AND ITS PROGENY
Virtually contemporaneous with-although after-Hodges, the
Ninth Circuit addressed the preemptive scope of the ADA with
respect to personal injury claims and reached a different conclu-
Airlines, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc.,
811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
17 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995).
1 See id. at 338.
19 Id. at 339.
20 See id. at 336; see also Smith, 44 F.3d at 346 ("[N]either the language nor the
history of the ADA implies that Congress was attempting to displace state per-
sonal injury tort law concerning the safety of airline business.").
21 See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336-37, 339.
22 See49 U.S.C. § 41112(a) (1994).
23 See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336-37.
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sion. In Harris v. American Airlines,24 the court preempted a pas-
senger's claims against American Airlines where the flight
attendant continued to serve a boisterous passenger alcoholic
drinks and failed to restrain him from using outrageous and dis-
criminatory insults that offended the plaintiff.25 Plaintiff was a
first-class passenger who contended that the flight attendant's
failure to protect her was a breach of established airline proce-
dure. The court concluded that the conduct of the flight crew,
specifically how they exercised control over intoxicated and
rude passengers, related to a "service" through the provision of
alcohol.26
The dissent, on the other hand, opined that the majority in-
correctly classified serving alcoholic beverages as a "service."
Taking into consideration the ADA's purpose of economic de-
regulation, these "services,"Judge William Norris noted, "should
be limited to economic decisions regarding the provision of
drinks," for example, "whether or not to provide drinks on any
flight, and contractual decisions about whether to charge for
the drinks or provide them free." 27
Despite its recent vintage, Harris has been interpreted and ap-
plied by numerous district courts. In Costa v. American Airlines,
Inc.,28 the plaintiff sued American Airlines for injuries she sus-
tained when another unidentified passenger opened an over-
head bin and caused a bag to fall on her as she sat in an aisle
seat. Plaintiff alleged "American violated its duty of care as a
common carrier in several respects, including failure of its flight
attendants to stop or identify the other passenger, American's
routine destruction of the passenger list shortly after the flight,
and the airline's refusal to honor Costa's request for a window
seat. "29
The court disagreed with the plaintiff and granted American's
motion for summary judgment. Reasoning that the Ninth Cir-
cuit "necessarily rejected the contractual definition adopted by
the Fifth Circuit," Judge Gary Taylor applied Harris's broad defi-
nition of "services" to reject plaintiffs claims even though he
24 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995).
25 See id. at 1476-77.
26 See id.
27 Id. at 1478 (Norris, J., dissenting).
28 892 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Cal. 1995). But see Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110
F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
29 Id. at 238.
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expressed concern regarding the expanse of Harris's holding. 0
Indeed, Judge Taylor cited the collected authorities in the Har-
ris dissent.
Similar to Costa, the district court in Stone v. Continental Air-
lines, Inc.31 felt bound by the holding in Harris and held (that
the ADA) preempted a first class passenger's injury claims based
on facts almost identical to those in Harris.32
In Manning v. Skywest Airlines,3 which was decided on a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff in a small turboprop
Fairchild SA-27 alleged that she was thrown violently into a bulk-
head and suffered a herniated cervical disc and emotional dis-
tress when the pilot temporarily lost control of the aircraft after
passing through wake turbulence of a Boeing 747 jet. Noting
that Harris was "contrary to the weight of authority interpreting
ADA preemption," the court determined that plaintiff's state law
claim, which stemmed directly from the pilot's negligent opera-
tion of the aircraft, was not preempted. 4
Holding that the claim did not relate to "service" as defined
by the ADA, the court first determined that the plaintiff would
be left without a remedy if her actions were preempted because
there was no federal action for her to pursue. 35 The court then
relied on the dicta in Wolens to show that the preemption clause
could not have been intended to bar all personal injury claims.3 6
Finally, the court reasoned that Congress's retention of liability
insurance requirements for airlines indicates its desire to with-
hold tort immunity from the airlines.37 "If, as defendant's read-
ing of Harris requires, all tort claims are preempted by section
41713(b) (1), then the requirement for liability insurance would
be superfluous."38
30 Id. at 238-39 ("It seems unlikely [that] either Congress or the Supreme
Court would have intended this broad result or the impact it may have on bodily
injury claims arising from other kinds of airline services.").
31 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995).
32 See id. at 825 ("[T]he factual distinctions between Harris and the instant case
are not significant enough to distinguish the holding.").
33 946 F. Supp. 767 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
34 See id. at 770.
35 See id. at 771.
36 See id. at 771-72. The dicta suggested that "personal injury claims relating to
airline operations" would not be preempted. American Airlines v. Wolens, 513
U.S. 219 (1995) (noting that both defendant airline and the United States, as
amicus curiae, agreed that safety-related personal injury claims would not likely
be preempted).




Gee involved four separate actions consolidated for argument.
In each of these actions, the lower court granted summary judg-
ment to the defendant airline based on the view that Harris
mandated preemption of appellants' state law tort claims and on
the "far-reaching" scope of the ADA adopted therein.
A. GF.- AND RO.Z'Y
Shirley Gee boarded a Southwest Airlines flight from Los An-
geles to Oakland and sat behind a wedding party. The wedding
party was noisy, and Gee asked some of the members to stop
making so much noise. She also complained to a flight attend-
ant and asked the attendant not to serve the group any more
alcohol because they appeared to be intoxicated. Nevertheless,
the attendant served one beer apiece to three members of the
wedding party. Gee claimed that after her complaint, members
of the wedding party harassed her with racial slurs, pantomimed
cocking and shooting a gun at Gee and her companions, and
threatened to "get them" upon landing. She filed suit in Cali-
fornia state court against Southwest for a variety of tort actions.3 9
Southwest removed the case to federal court on diversity
grounds. The district court granted Southwest's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the claims were
preempted.40
Jan Rowley, who is paralyzed from the chest down and re-
quires a motorized scooter for mobility, advised American Air-
lines prior to her flight that she would need an aisle chair (a
narrow wheelchair that can be rolled between seats) to assist her
in moving from the door of the plane to her seat. American
assured her that such assistance would be available. American
failed to provide the aisle chair in either Dallas or Portland, in
violation of the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA). As a result,
Rowley claimed she was forced to make an arduous journey to
and from her seat by holding on to seats and overhead compart-
ments while American employees watched. Rowley also re-
39 See Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997). These
actions included: negligence per se for violation of FAA regulations against
boarding or serving intoxicated passengers; negligence; negligent training and
supervision; intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; respon-
deat superior; and violating California Code provisions protecting people from
threats, harassment, intimidation or assault, including those based on race.
40 See Gee v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. C 94-03983 CW, 1995 WL 652463, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1995), affid, 110 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
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quested American to return her motorized scooter to the door
of the plane in Dallas and Portland, but it failed to do so. In
Portland, American also failed to reassemble the scooter for her
after it had been disassembled for stowage.
Rowley filed suit for compensatory and punitive damages
under the ACAA and asserted several state tort claims for inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The dis-
trict judge granted American's motion for summary judgment
with respect to the tort claims, finding them to be expressly pre-
empted by the ADA. The remaining compensatory damage
claim under the ACAA was tried to a jury, which found that
American violated the ACAA by failing to provide the aisle chair
and failing to return the motorized scooter to Rowley. The jury,
however, awarded zero compensatory damages.4"
After reluctantly concluding that it was bound by the holding
in Harris, even though it was a "far-reaching" decision, the court
had no trouble finding Gee's situation to be "virtually identical"
to that in Harris.42 It reasoned that, under Harris, Gee's negli-
gence claim against Southwest for emotional distress is "related
to" the service of alcoholic beverages to passengers and the
crew's in-flight conduct towards unruly passengers. Therefore,
it ruled that Gee's claims were preempted under the ADA. Simi-
larly, the court held that Rowley's claim of emotional injury
based on the conduct of American employees who failed to pro-
vide assistance with her disability was likewise preempted. It
found "no real distinction between the Harris claims based on
the 'in-flight' conduct of the crew, and Rowley's claims based on
the pre- and post-flight conduct of the American employees." 43
If the provision of drink is an airline "service," then the assist-
ance (or lack thereof) in boarding and deplaning passengers is
also a service. Under Harris, Rowley's attempt to pursue state
tort claims involved activities that "related to" service and are
thus preempted.
B. GADBuRY AND COSTA
Herbert Gadbury was a passenger on a 1993 Delta Air Lines
flight who alleged that during takeoff acceleration and banking,
41 "Rowley also filed a motion in limine regarding the availability of damages
under the ACAA, and the district court held that 'federal law permits recovery of
compensatory damages for violation of the ACAA, but not punitive damages."'
110 F.3d at 1403. This holding was appealed as well. See id.
42 See id. at 1406.
43 Id.
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a door on a service cart swung open and struck his knee.
Gadbury brought suit in Oregon state court alleging common
law negligence, and Delta removed the case to federal district
court. Delta admitted that the door opened after takeoff and
that it "was not correctly latched by the flight attendants just
prior to takeoff."4 The district court granted summary judg-
ment for Delta, upholding a magistrate's finding that Gadbury's
claim was preempted.
Donna Costa was a passenger on an American Airlines flight
who claimed injuries from another passenger who opened the
overhead bin upon landing, causing a suitcase to fall onto her
head.
As to the claims of these two plaintiffs, the court found it ap-
propriate to distinguish those claims stemming from "negligent
rendition of service," which it held were preempted, and those
relating to "operations and maintenance," which it held were
not preempted, even though the court admitted that "there is
no strict dichotomy between 'operations and maintenance' and
'service."' 4 5 The court distinguished the Gadbury and Costa
claims from Harris and held that, based on this distinction, those
claims were not preempted. "Emotional injury claims stemming
from the 'negligent rendition of service' are quite different
from safety-related personal injury or death claims concerning
airline operations or maintenance."46 As in Manning, the court
also found that Congress's retention of liability insurance re-
quirements for airlines would be superfluous if airlines were im-
mune from all liability stemming from passenger injury claims.47
- Id. at 1403.
45 Id. at 1407 (citing Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir.
1995)). This aspect of the court's holding is far from revolutionary because it was
foreshadowed by the Northern District's holding in DuCombs v. Trans World
Airlines, 937 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Cal. 1996) and by Hodges. In DuCombs, for exam-
ple, Judge Fern Smith stated that "storing baggage and warning passengers of the
dangers of items falling from overhead compartments, though it may be classi-
fied as conduct of the flight crew, is not per se a 'service' under Harris, as it is not
associated with the service of providing food and beverages." Id. at 902. In
Hodges, the court ruled that preemption does not extend to "state tort actions for
personal physical injuries or property damage caused by the operation and mainte-
nance of aircraft." Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336 (emphasis added).
46 Gee, 110 F.3d at 1406.
47 As discussed, the Savings Clause requires that aircraft carriers maintain in-
surance to cover liability for personal injury, death, or property damage resulting
from the operation of the aircraft. See 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a) (1994).
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Finally, the court emphasized that the distinction is "harmoni-
ous" with results reached in other circuit and district courts.48
In Gadbury, Delta agreed that the service/operations distinc-
tion may be appropriate, but argued that Gadbury's claim was
still preempted because it was more related to "service." Delta
argued that Gadbury was injured by a "serving" cart, and the
primary purpose of the cart is to provide on-board services, such
as waste collection, to passengers. According to the court,
Delta's rationale would lead to absurd results: If Gadbury had
been injured by a loose piece of safety equipment, rather than a
loose piece of serving equipment, presumably Delta would ad-
mit the claim could proceed. Gadbury's claim stems from
Delta's negligence in failing to properly latch the door during
takeoff. Thus, the court held that "Gadbury's claim did not re-
late to airline service but rather was connected with the failure
to take appropriate safety measures relating to the operation of
the aircraft."4 9
Costa's common law tort claims stemmed from luggage falling
onto her from the overhead compartment. The court agreed
with the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Hodges, which found that
"whether luggage may be placed in overhead bins and whether
the flight attendants properly monitor compliance with over-
head rack regulations are matters that pertain to the safe opera-
tion of a flight," and thus are not preempted. 50 On the other
hand, the court noted that many of Costa's claims pertained to
violations of California civil code provisions that impose a
higher duty of care on common carriers. This statutorily im-
posed standard of care is not a law of "general applicability" that
happens to indirectly relate to airline service and, thus, amounts
to an attempt by California to impose its own substantive stan-
dards on airlines. Accordingly, this civil code standard of care is
preempted by the ADA.5'
48 See Gee, 110 F.3d at 1407 (citing, among others, Hodges and Smith).
49 Id.
50 Id. (citing Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339). The court also ruled on Costa's claim for
negligent spoliation of evidence based on American's destruction of passenger
lists despite its notice of the incident was not preempted because maintaining
such a list is not a "'service' typically provided to passengers." Id. at 1407-08.
51 The court directed that while Costa's tort claims may proceed, these claims
should be evaluated under the common law standard of care. See id. at 1408.
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C. JUDGE O'SCANNLAIN'S CONCURRING OPINION
While Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain's opinion was labeled a
"concurring" one, he declined to embrace the majority's distinc-
tion between "service" and "operation and maintenance." 52 Ob-
serving that "the majority constructs a seemingly simple rule,"
Judge O'Scannlain believed that this rule's "emphasis on a few
words taken out of context needlessly muddles" the preemption
jurisprudence. 3 The preemptive scope of the ADA, reasoned
the Judge, should be guided by congressional intent.54
According to Judge O'Scannlain, the majority opinion "is no
more likely than the Harris decision to bring clarity to the airline
preemption field."55 Instead, he reasons, the courts should ex-
amine the regulatory effect of the state tort claim.
The proper inquiry then is whether the state common law tort
remedies have the effect of frustrating the purpose of deregula-
tion by interfering with the forces of competition. If the state law
does not have the requisite regulatory effect, then it is simply
"too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a matter" to have preemp-
tive effect.56
V. THE IMPLICATION OF GEE
In an apparent effort to retract from the "far-reaching"57 pre-
emption holding of Harris and bring itself back into line with
the majority view, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish the
Harris holding by drawing a distinction between state law claims
relating to the rendition of service and those concerning opera-
tions and maintenance. Under this distinction, state law claims
based on the following airline conduct are preempted under
the ADA because such conduct relates to "services":
" Flight crew's failure to exercise control over intoxicated and
rude passengers.58
" Flight crew's failure to prevent a battery committed by one pas-
senger against another.59
52 Id. at 1409.
53 Id.
54 See id. at 1410.
55 Id.
56 Id. (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 390 (1992)).
57 See id. at 1404-06.
58 See id. at 1400, 1406; Harris v. American Airlines, 55 F.3d 1472, 1476 (9th
Cir. 1995).
59 See Romano v. American Trans Air, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1637 (1996).
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Flight crew's failure to provide assistance to disabled
passengers.6 °
By contrast, state law claims based on the following conduct
are not preempted because such conduct relates to an airline's
"operation and maintenance:"
" Passenger being "bumped" from a flight.61
" Negligent reconfirmation of a reservation.62
" Baggage or other objects falling from overhead storage bins. 63
" Pilot's losing control of the aircraft.64
" Flight crew's failure to take appropriate safety measures relat-
ing to the operation of the aircraft, i.e., latching of service
door.65
" Airline's "spoliation of evidence" by destroying passenger
lists. 66
Did Congress in drafting the ADA or the Court in Morales and
Wolens intend such a "hodgepodge" of results? Probably not.
The distinction between "service" and "operation and mainte-
nance" is unworkable in practice. The pilot's losing control of
an aircraft arguably is no more related to the aircraft's "safety"
or "operations" than the flight crew's treatment of passengers.
Even the court in Gee recognized that "it is difficult to imagine a
more critical airline service than aircraft navigation."67 More-
over, a fine line between service and operation simply cannot
(and perhaps should not) be drawn with respect to, for exam-
ple, a flight crew's negligent spilling of a hot beverage on a pas-
senger's lap by letting the container fall through an unlatched
service cart door. Gee's reasoning suggests that both service and
operation may be implicated by the crew's conduct.68 In sum,
60 See Gee, 110 F.3d at 1400, 1406.
61 See West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993).
62 See Lathigra v. British Airways PLC, 41 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994).
63 See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 334, 339; Gee, 110 F.3d at 1400, 1406.
6 See Manning v. Skywest Airlines, 946 F. Supp. 767, 771 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
65 See Gee, 110 F.3d at 1400, 1407.
66 See id. at 1400, 1407-08.
67 See id. at 1407 (emphasis added).
68 This is a hybrid scenario. The crew's conduct relates to both the service of
beverages to passengers, as in Gee, and the failure to take appropriate safety meas-
ures relating to the operation of the aircraft, as in Gadbury. Judge O'Scannlain
provided other examples:
For example, a damage claim by an airplane passenger hit by an
article falling from an overhead bin would be preempted if the
flight attendant dropped the article but not if the bin came open
because of a latch that had not been properly maintained, or be-
cause the plane was jolted by turbulent weather. An airplane pas-
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Judge O'Scannlain correctly pointed out that the majority hold-
ing "is no more likely than the Harris decision to bring clarity to
the airline preemption field."69 That is not to say, however, that
his approach-to examine the regulatory or "competitive" effect
of state laws-is a better one. But the fact is that, absent gui-
dance from Congress, courts are relegated to the unenviable
role of interpreting the meaning of airline "services."7"
senger who fell in an aisle would be prohibited from suing if the
accident occurred when the passenger slipped on food dropped by
a flight attendant, but not if the accident was caused by a sudden
banking of the plane.
Id. at 1410 (citing Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 284 (Tex.
1996)).
69 Id. (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
70 See id. at 1409 ("[T]he only proper framework for evaluating preemption
claims is Congressional intent.") (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that the purpose of Congress is the "ultimate touch-
stone" of the preemption analysis)).
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